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INTRODUCTION
Whether states have Article III standing is a question that has in recent
years induced a puzzling and nonstandard patterning of votes amongst the
Justices of the Supreme Court. It is, of course, not uncommon for that bench
to be characterized by sharp ideological divides. What is unusual and symptomatic in the state standing litigation context is rather this: specific Justices
seem to adopt divergent, seemingly inconsistent, positions on the same basic
question of constitutional law when it is presented in different litigation mat© 2019 Aziz Z. Huq. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law & Mark Claster Mamolen
Teaching Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. Work on this paper was supported by
the Frank J. Cicero Fund. I am very grateful to the Notre Dame Law Review’s editors for their
careful work, and for their initial invitation, and to Maggie Lemos for helpful comments.
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ters.1 When it comes to state standing, the Court’s ideological divide is not
merely acute but also inconstant and unstable.
Consider, for example, two recent cases in an evenly divided eight-member Court which was unable to reach a decision on this Article III issue. The
Court as a result demurred from a decision in both cases, albeit to divergent
effect in the two matters.2 Although we do not know the breakdown in votes
in either case, I think it is reasonable to assign the “liberal” and “conservative”3 Justices to the opposite sides of the state standing issue in these two
cases based on the questions and preferences evinced in the oral arguments.4
That is, the liberals (conservatives) sometimes embraced state standing, and
sometimes uniformly rejected it. This suggests that the question of state
standing does not have an obvious and unidirectional ideological valence. It
rather implies that its ideological valence is unstable for individual Justices,
even holding constant the bench’s composition.
A dismayingly plausible interpretation of this dynamic would begin with
the basic unpredictability of Article III standing doctrine and its consequent
vulnerability to partisan polarization effects among the Justices in high-profile public law litigation. Where a state presses a left-leaning position, the
logic goes, Justices and commentators take predictable positions pro and
contra—and vice versa. This happens because the doctrine either cannot or
more contingently does not impose a frictional constraint on the expression
of their normative priors. The ensuing constellation of votes, and hence
majority or dissenting opinions, can be predicted with some confidence if
one knows which President appointed a Justice and how they would vote on
the merits of a case.

1 At a high enough generality, of course, it is possible to identify a number of parallel
cases. Consider the choice between constitutional rules and standards. See Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 98 (1992) (“[S]trong
substantive theories of rules as conservative and standards as liberal—or vice versa—are
wrong.”). State standing is unusual insofar as the pivots by individual Justices occur across
cases with the same kind of plaintiff pressing slight variants on the same basic interest.
2 Compare Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011) (affirming
the existence of state standing to pursue federal common-law nuisance claims), with Texas
v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–60 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (affirming state standing to challenge a federal policy related
to immigration).
3 I think these labels are increasingly irrelevant and misleading. “Liberal” Justices are
in many ways quite Burkean, while “conservatives” will increasingly be in the position of
trashing long-standing understandings of the law. It seems to me that better labels are
required, but that is not my project here. I therefore stick to the conventional labels.
4 It is clear in American Electric Power that the Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents would have found standing while those appointed by Republican Presidents would
not. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 420. That the opposite was the case in United States
v. Texas is evident from an examination of the transcript of the oral argument. See, e.g.,
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 11–12, 14–16, Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2771 (No.15-674).
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Such a view would not break new ground. Law reviews and journals
resound with complaints about standing doctrine’s mutability5 as well as its
mismatch with attractive normative accounts of Article III ends.6 But complaints about its unique incoherence are somewhat overstated. Some degree
of instability is probably inevitable in multimember bodies such as the
Supreme Court given social choice dynamics.7 That this instability would
take on familiar partisan form in cases concerning policy questions with obvious and strong partisan coloring—such as immigration law,8 environmental
law,9 and national healthcare policy10—is by no stretch surprising given the
larger pattern of partisan polarization among the Justices.
Still, it is not very satisfying to end the analysis with this stark “legal realist” conclusion.11 Nor do I think it is enough to simply assume it is possible
to assert some “principled” account of state standing without thinking about
why the doctrine has generated these concurrent but diametrically opposed
votes on similar cases. Brute resort to partisanship as an explanation is insufficient not because it lacks predictive power, or because it is somehow false.
Rather, in the United States of the early twenty-first century, national partisan
divides tend to track deep and consequential normative divides.12 Resiling to
partisanship to account for doctrinal difference may be accurate,13 but it
obscures far more interesting questions about how and why recondite matters
of federal jurisdiction take on more readily cognized political colors. It fails
to illuminate why a division of votes happens. To the extent that legal scholarship aims to map, and then plot potential pathways across, normative contestation, partisanship-based explanans can be both powerful and
5 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061,
1061–62 (2015) (describing, in critical terms, current doctrinal fragmentation); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 393, 480 (1996) (arguing that standing doctrine is “theoretically incoherent”).
6 See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 486–88
(2008) (criticizing standing doctrine’s distributional effects).
7 The leading application of social choice theory to multimember benches is Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 102–15 (1986).
8 See, e.g., Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271. There have also been several suits lodged by states
against the federal government related to “sanctuary jurisdiction” policies. See Vikram
David Amar, Essay, Federalism Friction in the First Year of the Trump Presidency, 45 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 401, 401–02, 402 n.4 (2018) (documenting suits).
9 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
10 See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); Florida
ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
11 See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663 (1977) (“Decisions on questions of standing are concealed decisions
on the merits of the underlying constitutional claim.”).
12 See, e.g., STEPHEN HAWKINS ET AL., HIDDEN TRIBES: A STUDY OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED
LANDSCAPE (2018), https://hiddentribes.us/pdf/hidden_tribes_report.pdf.
13 For a useful discussion of various intertemporal measures of ideological preferences, see Michael A. Bailey, Is Today’s Court the Most Conservative in Sixty Years? Challenges
and Opportunities in Measuring Judicial Preferences, 75 J. POL. 821 (2013).
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simultaneously unavailing for the task at hand. They beg the question of how
we are to interpret ideological divisions on the Court by ousting an analysis of
ideas with the brute act of taxonomy.
Nor do I think it is plausible to stipulate by fiat a single normative key to
the state standing problem by appealing to text, original public meaning, or
the like. There is already some air between the lexical anchors of Article III
standing—the terms “case” and “controversy” in disconnected elements of
the Constitution’s text—and the normative motors of current standing doctrine. That doctrine has further developed largely in terms of cases lodged
by private litigants; its translation to state actors is not necessarily a neat or
obvious one.14 There are hence a large number of disarticulated joints in
the doctrinal armature tying constitutional meaning to its application in specific circumstances.
As a result of these gaps, theoretical ipse dixits are decidedly
underwhelming. The litigated world is too fluid to be nailed down by formalist or originalist certainties. This problem undermines perhaps the most
cogent alternative analytic method to the approach I take here. This
approach would turn to a historical consideration of states’ ability to lodge
certain kinds of suits in federal courts.15 The leading historical study in this
vein, however, implicitly assumes that the background relationships of states
vertically with the federal government and its own citizens, and also horizontally to other states, have been constant and stable enough to enable meaningful transhistorical comparisons. I am not sure that is right (in fact, I am
pretty sure it is wrong). The need for some translation of historical doctrine
to a contemporary context creates a need for normative criteria to evaluate
whether the linkages between anterior doctrinal forms and constitutional
norms persist or have evaporated.16 History, in short, entails normative exegesis as much as any other modality of constitutional inquiry.
In what follows, I offer a quite modest contribution to debates on state
standing.17 I do not offer “right answers.” Rather, I posit that it is useful to
14 Cf. Fallon, supra note 5, at 1080 (“The Supreme Court apparently never intended
that the injury in fact, causation, and redressability requirements would apply to the federal and state governments in the same way as to private litigants.”).
15 The leading (and still invaluable) account is Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387 (1995).
16 For criticisms and defenses of historically infused accounts on these terms, compare
Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 51–53 (2014) (arguing that
separate spheres no longer accurately describe government and that governmental standing rules should be modified accordingly), with Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty
Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 236 (2014) (cataloging reasons for resisting such
updating).
17 My own normative thinking on institutional standing is nuanced. First, I have suggested that “institutional litigants [such as states] . . . will do a better job than their individual counterparts” in pressing structural constitutional claims. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the
Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1509 (2013) [hereinafter Huq, Standing]. I
underscored that this claim had “but limited reach” insofar as it was a comparative and not
an absolute claim. Id. To the extent other scholars have been kind enough to read and

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL510.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 5

state standing’s uncertain stakes

1-JUL-19

13:48

2131

understand the “stakes” of state standing. By “stakes,” I mean the practical
consequences of resolving, one way or another, the unsettled doctrinal
choices respecting the ability of states to initiate a matter in federal courts.
Why, that is, does state standing matter? An inquiry into stakes can usefully
proceed stepwise. A first task is to identify the subset of state standing cases
that presently elicit division among the Justices. A second task is to articulate
the interesting normative consequences of narrowing or widening the Article
III gauge in this contested class. Parts I and II attend respectively to these
tasks.
In particular, I aim here to flesh out the multifarious character of downstream consequences plausibly related to state standing doctrine. For example, it is already a familiar claim in litigation over this Article III question that
a denial of state standing will lead to an issue’s nonjusticiability. My analysis
suggests we should be a bit skeptical of that notion. This skepticism, in turn,
helps decenter what has become a modal concern in state standing debates.
Instead, it suggests the value of attending to other, less familiar institutionaldesign implications, such as effects on the structural Constitution and the
incentives of state officials. In the end, I suggest that the latter may well be
more important than any other concern.
My conclusion then draws back from the specifics of state standing to
develop some more general reflections on the contents and aims of federal
courts scholarship in an era of obvious and powerful partisan and ideological
polarization. Put crudely, the animating worry there is whether the deepingly polarizing of American society, which the Court cannot escape, alters
the way that scholars—putatively above the partisan fray—should talk about
and think about the law of federal jurisdiction.
I. DOMAINS

OF

UNCERTAINTY

AND

STABILITY

IN

STATE STANDING DOCTRINE

Doctrinal and scholarly debates about state standing occur against a
backdrop of the reasonably stable, albeit still underspecified, doctrinal framework of general Article III standing jurisprudence. In consequence, it is useful to begin by locating state standing debates in that larger doctrinal
context. I then disentangle two strands of state standing jurisprudence in
terms of their stability. Some forms are relatively uncontroversial and so
fixed, I suggest, while others generate sharp discord and fluidity. The second
category of contested applications of state standing is the subset of greatest
interest here. Having isolated that contested domain, I briefly consider two
recent academic treatments of state standing to demonstrate how much
remains unsettled even among scholars.
note that piece, they have elided the comparative nature of the claim and construed me as
embracing institutional standing tout court. See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 16, at 211
n.12. With all due respect, this is a misreading. Also, in subsequent work, I have argued
more broadly against the justiciability of federalism interests. See Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic
of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 295–98 (2014) [hereinafter Huq, Collective Action]; see also Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014) (developing a bargaining-based model of such contestation).
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A. State Standing as a Standing Problem
The term “standing” emerged in the early twentieth century to describe
the regulatory principle governing access to the federal courts.18 If an analog understanding obtained in the nineteenth century, it took more uncertain and blurred form. Standing’s precursors drew on “general principles of
jurisprudence” as well as inchoate notions of “popular sovereignty, limited
government, and the separation of powers.”19 As presently implemented in
doctrinal form, standing comprises a familiar trinity: injury in fact, causation,
and redressability.20 Although each of these elements is in different ways
contested, it is the first injury-in-fact requirement that animates the lion’s
share of ambiguity in both run-of-the-mill standing cases and in state standing disputes. This parallelism matters. If uncertainty about state standing is
a simple function of unclarity in respect to the corresponding piece of more
general doctrine, there is unlikely to be any way of resolving state standing’s
uncertainty without a clarification of Article III standing doctrine more
generally.
Consider, to begin with, the ambiguity arising principally from the
injury-in-fact requirement when a state is not the plaintiff.21 A judge applying this element of Article III doctrine needs to measure a plaintiff’s allegations against some concept of constitutionally sufficient “injury.” In the early
18 John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1009 (2002) (asserting that the Supreme
Court “fabricat[ed] the doctrine[ ] of standing” in the twentieth century); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1451–52 (1988) (dating the emergence of constitutional standing doctrine in the
post–New Deal period); accord Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein,
What’s Standing?] (describing standing doctrine as a judicial “invention” of the twentieth
century).
19 Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 689, 694 (2004); id. at 712 (appealing to “the more general notion that public
officers pursue public rights and private parties pursue private rights”). Woolhandler and
Nelson recognized that “early American courts did not use the term ‘standing’ much.” Id.
at 691. They instead seek to find analogs with other nomenclature. See, e.g., id. at 705–06
(characterizing “the restriction on private invocations of public rights” at common law as
an early standing doctrine).
20 See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 134 (2011)
(explaining that establishing standing requires an injury in fact, a causal link between the
injury and the action complained of, and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (same);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)
(same); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (same); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (same). You get the idea.
21 For the pathmarking use of this phrase, see Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (“The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”); Sunstein, What’s Standing?, supra note 18, at 185 (tracing the injury-in-fact demand to the
“remarkably sloppy” opinion in Data Processing).
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days of standing doctrine, a private law understanding infused with commonlaw concepts of contract and tort provided raw material for this baseline.22
The injury inquiry, however, becomes more complicated when the judge is
asked to decide whether a right created by statute suffices for Article III purposes.23 How are statutory interests to be ranked with a common-law ruler?24
There are conflicting signs. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has said
that “the injury-in-fact test . . . suggested that there was a prelegal category of
injuries.”25 On the other hand, early cases also suggested that some “direct
stake in the outcome of a litigation—even though small” would suffice.26 But
then still, later cases took more restrictive stances.27 The standard doctrinal
formulation that an injury in fact is “concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent” does little to illuminate the problem.28 With the doctrine pointing in all directions at once, the judge is left with a seemingly unappetizing
choice between simply treating all interests that a legislature creates as sufficient for Article III purposes, or else fashioning ex nihlio some threshold that
legislatively created rights must cross in order to be treated as a sufficient
injury.29 But since statutory rights are often created precisely because there
is no analog common-law interest on the books, this task lacks any obvious
compass or framework.
Perhaps then we should not be all that surprised that the Court has
never fully resolved the question of when “a right created by Congress nonetheless fall[s] below the ‘hard floor’ of Article III jurisdiction.”30 Evidence of
22 Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432,
1434 (1988) (noting “the use of common-law understandings to define the judicial role in
public-law cases”).
23 Doctrines such as injury in fact “are superfluous in cases involving the violation of
private rights.” F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 275, 290 (2008). For examples of the generally skeptical approach to Congress’s
power to create new injuries-in-fact, see Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing
Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 166–67 (2011) (canvassing options for Congress to work
around Article III limits, and finding them limited); Mark Seidenfeld & Allie Akre, Standing in the Wake of Statutes, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 745, 748 (2015) (arguing that “Congress cannot
create standing, but that it can recognize interests and thereby influence judicial evaluation of whether an interest is sufficiently concrete and immediate to justify standing”).
24 See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1434.
25 Id. at 1448.
26 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 689 (1973).
27 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755–56 (1984) (refusing to find standing for
stigmatic injury because “such injury is not judicially cognizable”); Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982)
(holding that psychological injury is insufficient to confer standing).
28 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)); see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (requiring that plaintiffs have a “personal stake in the outcome of
a controversy” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))).
29 This dilemma is spelled out in some detail in William Baude, Standing in the Shadow
of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 199–222.
30 Id. at 209.
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the lingering uncertainty can be found in the Court’s recent divided ruling
in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.31 The Spokeo plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act alleging that the defendant website operator had published
inaccurate, albeit nondefamatory, information about him.32 The majority
opinion at once recognized that “Congress has the power to define injuries
and articulate chains of causation . . . where none existed before.”33 At the
same time, it also endorsed “Article III minima” that legislation cannot abrogate.34 Rather than mapping a line between these conflicting principles, the
Court issued a narrow ruling that the plaintiff’s injury had not been “concrete” in that sense that “it must actually exist” and be “ ‘real,’ and not
‘abstract.’ ”35 I leave it to readers to determine how much wiser they feel with
that Solomonic guidance in hand.
Ambiguity in the definition of injury in fact in the mine-run of cases
concerning Article III standing spills over directly into ambiguity in the terms
of state standing. The Court has not abandoned standing’s familiar tripartite
formulation when the plaintiff seeking jurisdiction is a state rather than a
natural person. To the contrary, recent state standing cases invoke that
familiar doctrinal refrain.36 The Court has also, in much debated language,
suggested that states receive “special solicitude” when they assert Article III
standing37—but this has not, to my knowledge, been understood to constitute a derogation of the familiar injury-in-fact rule. Indeed, as much attention as this “special solicitude” language has attracted, I am not sure that the
doctrine would be any less pellucid had it never been used.
Instead of focusing on the “special solicitude” that states receive, a useful
way to encapsulate the zone of contestation in state standing doctrine is to
trace a parallel to disputes about legislatively created interests: draw a line
around the domain of cases in which the state is not asserting a familiar common-law interest but instead is pointing to an interest without a clear or
uncontested common-law analog. Just as the Court in cases such as Spokeo
struggles with the problem of defining some litmus test to measure the adequacy of a congressionally forged interest, so too a federal court must find

31 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
32 Id. at 1544, 1546.
33 Id. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
34 Id. at 1548 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100
(1979)).
35 Id. at 1548. The Court also emphasized that it did not mean to imply that the injury
must be tangible, or that it could not be probabilistic in nature. Id. at 1549.
36 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“[A] litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable
decision will redress that injury.”).
37 Id. at 520.
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some external baseline to test what kind of state-specific interests fit within
the box of Article III injury in fact.38
B. Easy and Hard Problems in the Jurisprudence of State Standing
There is already an embarrassment of taxonomies for organizing state
standing cases.39 My aim in this Section is not to add a new taxonomy. It is
instead to draw attention to the ways in which state standing is or is not contested. This is a prelude to a more robust consideration of how the resolution of the underlying disputes will shape various outcomes of consequence.
With this ambition in mind, it is possible to divide roughly the Court’s
state standing jurisprudence into two classes—easy and hard. That distinction roughly tracks the distinction, described above,40 between instances in
which Article III standing analysis can draw upon a historical, often commonlaw, analog, and those instances in which a legislative body has created an
interest that lacks clear historical precedent. When the interest pressed by
the state is akin to a common-law interest, or otherwise has a historical pedigree, there is no terribly interesting injury-in-fact puzzle. But where the state
through its elected branches articulates an interest without obvious historical
or common-law analog, judges must confront the question whether there is
indeed an injury in fact without a clear measuring rod. Just as there is no
fixed benchmark in nonstate standing cases,41 so too there is not a clear
benchmark for unfamiliar interests in state standing cases. The result is a
38 I do not mean, however, to suggest that there is never contestation over other elements of the doctrine. For example, in Massachusetts v. EPA, causation was a flash point
between the majority and the dissent. Compare id. at 523–24, with id. at 542–43 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting). One way to understand the Massachusetts v. EPA decision is in terms of a
different debate concerning whether “the so-called Case or Controversy Clause has different requirements for private cases and for procedural rights cases in which Congress deliberately conferred a right of review on the general public.” Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine
Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 235 (2012).
This construal of the decision explains why the main divide in the case concerned the
causation and redressability prongs of the standing test, rather than the injury-in-fact
requirement.
39 See Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585,
595 (2015) (identifying four categories of interest); Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to
Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637, 640
(2016) (identifying three interests); Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State
Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2055 (2011) (identifying three kinds of interest); see also
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 15, at 406–34 (distinguishing three kinds of interest,
but distinct ones from Crocker’s). Several of these typologies distinguish between “sovereign” and “quasi-sovereign” interests. See, e.g., Crocker, supra, at 2055; see also Georgia v.
Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (using the term “quasi-sovereign”). I do not
use those terms in the main text because I think that they are not clear. See infra text
accompanying note 48 (discussing the ambiguity of the term “sovereignty”). For the purpose of my analysis, I think it is more helpful to identify lines of cases in terms of a less
abstract, more concrete formulation of the injury in fact asserted by the state plaintiff.
40 See discussion supra Section I.A.
41 See supra text accompanying notes 21–29.
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zone of hard, contested cases. My ultimate aim here is to better comprehend
the practical stakes of the decision whether to preserve or to eliminate standing in that zone.
That said, there is one way in which the dichotomy cutting across state
standing cases poses a distinct problem from the problem haunting nonstate
standing cases. In the latter, the Court is caught between two competing
normative impulses: give Congress its due as the principal lawmaking body of
the nation on the one hand, or ensure that there is a judicially enforceable
constraint on the range of matters that can come before Article III bodies.42
This tension is perceived as real and grave.43 At the same time, there is a
nagging question as to why it matters. Congress has very broad, and perhaps
plenary, power to create or eliminate Article III tribunals beyond the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. Given that there are almost no clear
constraints on the negative exercise of this power,44 it is at least analytically
puzzling why so much attention should be paid to the outer bounds of positive uses of the power. Why, that is, is the surfeit of Article III bounty perceived as so much more hazardous than its absence?45
In the state standing context, by contrast, it is state, rather than federal,
political choice that sits in the scales across from Article III autonomy. The
separation of powers dynamic of standing46 is thus not directly implicated in
42 The federal common-law rules that determine access to a national court for vindication of a constitutional right are shaped by the courts’ desire to exercise control over the
mix of cases they must adjudicate. See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of
Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 63–70 (2015). Standing doctrine might be
explained, as a matter of political sociology, in similar terms.
43 See, e.g., Baude, supra note 29, at 209.
44 For a summary of the pertinent law, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping
Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043 (2010).
45 Appeal to the text of the Constitution provides no good answer. The idea of “standing” as a limit on Article III jurisdiction is a bold inference from the disparate and separate
incidences of the terms “cases” and “controversies” in the Constitution’s text. Those terms
might have quite different implications. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 244 n.128 (1985)
(explaining that “case” and “controversies” are used to distinguish mandatory from discretionary forms of jurisdiction); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 599 (1994) (“I contend that the ‘all Cases’
reference in the Original Jurisdiction Clause incorporates not only the ‘controversies’ in
which states appear as parties but also the ‘cases’ that the menu describes as such.”). Moreover, it is not at all clear that Article III precludes, as an originalist or historical matter, the
assignment of noncontroverted matters to federal courts. See James E. Pfander, Standing,
Litigable Interests, and Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170,
175–82 (2018) (summarizing historical evidence). That is, the Court’s interpellation of
standing into constitutional jurisprudence may thus rest on quite dubious grounds from
the originalist perspective.
46 In fact, there are “at least four ways that standing protects the separation of powers.”
F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV. 673, 684
(2017) (illustrating these theories).
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all cases.47 Rather, the central analytic difficulty arises from a different
source: what counts as a valid and judicially cognizable interest of a state qua
state is not a function of empirical observation. It also cannot be resolved by
looking to the common law. Rather, the question is often framed as a matter
of “sovereignty.”48 But what does the term sovereignty mean in American
law? The notion of “sovereignty” has a long, complex intellectual history in
European political thought, from Bodin and Grotius onward.49 Its transplantation into the American context entailed intellectual ferment, and some
sharp deviations in that tradition’s arc.50 Today, its content and contours
remain at best “somewhat elusive.”51 Given the mutable and elusive nature
of sovereignty as a conceptual matter, it was probably inevitable that any
effort to create a doctrinal rule for state standing rooted in that concept
would generate confusion and instability. As a result, even if the notion of
“sovereignty” can provide a comforting verbal touchstone for analysis of state
standing,52 it is unlikely to shed any meaningful analytic clarity on the
matter.
There is one final point before I turn to the taxonomical analysis. I
should clarify and defend a simplifying assumption I will make in the analysis
that follows. As observed above, the formulation of injury in fact dates from
1970.53 But the number of Supreme Court cases that address state standing
after that date is relatively small. These cases, moreover, cite back to pre1970 precedent in ways that suggest the latter’s continued validity. Accordingly, I will ignore the timing of cases. Instead, I will approach the caselaw as
if both pre-1970 and post-1970 cases were equally relevant. I realize that this
is not an obvious, or obviously sociologically accurate, assumption. I do
think, however, that the prochronic assumption that pre-1970 cases
47 Consider cases in which both plaintiff and defendant are states. See, e.g., Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (permitting standing). Nor is obvious that state
standing will always have a particular separation of powers valence.
48 See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 851, 858 (2016) (rooting analysis of sovereignty in the background “concept that a
sovereign government must have standing to enforce and defend its laws in court”). In
contrast, others view sovereignty-based claims as the epitome of what cannot be vindicated
in federal court. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 15, at 410–12. So there is not even
agreement on sovereignty’s valence for assertions of state standing.
49 For a history of the concept of sovereignty in modern political thought, see generally RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY
(2016). For a summary of Tuck’s account and extending it to the contemporary U.S. context, see Aziz Z. Huq, The People Reconsidered, NEW RAMBLER (Oct. 17, 2016), http://
newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/political-science/the-people-reconsidered.
50 See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 8–10,
133–35, 178–79 (2010) (arguing that the significant innovation of the American federal
idea was to authorize the division of sovereignty and to create viable legal categories that
could contain multiple sources of governmental power within one overarching system).
51 Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 230 (2005).
52 See Grove, supra note 48, at 858.
53 See supra text accompanying note 21.
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accounted for the injury-in-fact rule is a relatively standard one given the
assumptions concerning precedent in constitutional decisions.54
1. Easy Problems
Let us start by enumerating “easy” cases for state standing doctrine.
These can fall both inside and outside the line of Article III permissibility.
Consider some that fall within the line of permissibility. First, since the early
days of the republic, states have been allowed to litigate their common-law
interests in federal court.55 Hence, a state can assert an interest in real property as a basis for standing or sue in federal court to enforce a contract.56 In
some cases, standing founded on property has been distinguished from
standing “in virtue of its sovereignty” as a ground for Article III access.57
Such language intimates, without confirming, the unavailability of sovereignty as a basis for standing.
Second, the Supreme Court in 1838 affirmed its power to resolve boundary disputes between states.58 It reasoned that there was “no power in the
contending states to settle a controverted boundary between themselves, as
states competent to act by their own authority on the subject matter, or in
any department of the government, if it was not in this [Court].”59 Boundary
disputes are analytically interesting because they share some of the qualities
of a common-law property dispute, but also entangle “sovereignty” of some
sort in a quite material way. They hence pose a hard problem for theories,
such as the one proposed by Professors Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins, that assert a sharp distinction between sovereign and nonsovereign
interests. Indeed, Woolhandler and Collins are a bit sheepish when they concede that boundary disputes are “the primary and largely exclusive example
54 At the same time, I recognize that the law of state standing has changed over time.
See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 15, at 474 (“The early expansion of governmental
standing highlighted the difficulty of defining litigable interests once the Court departed
from the common-law menu for standing.”).
55 Id. at 406–07 (discussing examples).
56 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 240–41 (1901) (finding federal jurisdiction appropriate “in cases involving boundaries and jurisdiction over lands and their inhabitants, and
in cases directly affecting the property rights and interests of a State”); cf. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405 (1792) (opinion of Johnson, J.) (rejecting request by State
for equitable remedy in a contract action, but leaving open a remedy at law). But not all
property disputes are cognizable. See Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1867)
(refusing to assert jurisdiction, where Georgia asserted federal infringements on its property interests because the “matter of property is neither stated as an independent ground,
nor is it noticed at all in the prayers for relief”).
57 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 559–60
(1851).
58 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
59 Id.; see also Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 57, 75 (2003) (finding for Virginia in a
suit over riverine rights); Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 381 (1991) (resolving boundary
disputes turning on the Ohio River’s course).
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of the early Court’s willingness to allow states to vindicate sovereignty
interests.”60
On the other side of the ledger are a number of state “injuries” that have
long been held to fall outside the reach of Article III justiciability. First, a
state’s allegation that the federal government “attempt[s] to legislate outside
the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution and within the field of
local powers exclusively reserved to the States” creates no justiciable controversy.61 A state, however, can challenge another state’s law on the ground
that it violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.62
Second, states as well as the federal government plainly have power to
file suit to enforce their own (criminal or civil) laws in their own tribunals.63
But states do not have standing to sue to enforce their own laws in federal
court.64 There is an exception of sorts when Congress authorizes the
removal of a criminal or a civil case from state to federal court. This exception, to be fair, is so infrequently invoked that it is of limited significance. It
also appears to be relatively settled that a state cannot resort to federal court
to vindicate—in the sense of enforcing—its own law on the ground that the
same case could be brought in state court. For instance, the Court has unanimously deflected state efforts to invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act for
state-law enforcement purposes when a state (but not a federal) declaratory
action would have been available.65
It is difficult to summarize these islands of stability in state standing doctrine. The early cases seem to distinguish proprietary from sovereign interests—except in boundary disputes, which are probably the most important
sort of a sovereignty-based claim in the early republic. States are stymied
60 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 15, at 416.
61 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923).
62 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591 (1923) (finding a state suit
justiciable when it raises the question “whether one may withdraw a natural product, a
common subject of commercial dealings, from an established current of commerce moving into the territory of the other” as “essentially a judicial question”).
63 Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show
That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239,
2251 (1999) (noting that the United States can prosecute crimes “based on nothing more
than the ‘harm to the common concern for obedience to law,’ and the ‘abstract . . . injury
to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed’” (alteration in original) (quoting FEC v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–24 (1998))); see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 15, at 422
(“States could, of course, litigate their sovereignty interests by enforcement actions in their
own courts. General jurisdictional principles operative during the nineteenth century,
however, did not allow a state to begin a prosecution under its laws in the courts of another
sovereign.”).
64 See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672–73 (1892) (making this point in
respect to criminal laws). An exception to this is when a state official files a habeas action
in federal court challenging detention based on his or her enforcement of state law in
violation of a federal injunction. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
65 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 21 (1983) (“There
are good reasons why the federal courts should not entertain suits by the States to declare
the validity of their regulations despite possibly conflicting federal law.”).
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when they insist on the conformity of federal action with constitutional
norms (at least absent any other injury), but are also held at bay if they wish
to insist on the force of their own statutory law. Hence, choice-of-law explanations for the cognizability of different interests for Article III purposes are
not easy to get off the ground. The result is a patchwork of rules that perhaps invites circumvention or substitution. The resulting zones of friction,
which I turn to next, might hence be preliminarily explained as a result of
strategic litigation in light of an invitingly incomplete latticework of rules.
2. Hard Problems
There are three zones in which state standing cases are “hard,” in the
sense that it is presently unsettled whether litigation by a state actor can proceed, or where the current doctrinal dispensation seems to rest on fine, and
hence untenable, distinctions between different formulations of state interests. The three lines of cases, I should acknowledge up front, are not distinct
from each other. The third, indeed, spills over from the first and second
categories. But I think it is helpful to introduce the three lines of cases separately because they hinge on the treatment of three distinct putative injuriesin-fact. Further, I should be clear that in mapping these three areas, I make
no claim to resolve the disagreements manifest on the Court. Rather, for
present purposes, my concern is with understanding the doctrinal wellsprings of uncertainty.
A first class of hard cases concerns instances in which the state acts as a
so-called “parens patriae.” Parens patriae loosely means “parent of the country.”66 States invoke the parens patriae doctrine to bring actions to federal
courts on behalf of their citizens.67 For example, states have successfully
asserted the interests of their citizens, without adumbrating their own “sovereign” rights, against a quarantine that impinged on interstate commerce,68
against the producers of interstate air pollution,69 against aquatic pollution
that threatened the “health and comfort of the inhabitants of [the plaintiff
State],”70 and for the alleged maltreatment of state citizens in violation of
federal law.71
66 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600, 607
(1982) (envisaging such a suit where a “sufficiently substantial segment of [the state’s]
population” suffers the relevant harm); see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S.
251, 257 (1972) (noting that “the term was used to refer to the King’s power as guardian of
persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves,” and “the parens patriae suit has been
greatly expanded in the United States beyond that which existed in England”).
67 Robert A. Weinstock, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of Public Goods,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799 n.12 (2009).
68 See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900).
69 See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236–37 (1907).
70 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
71 See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608. Courts are divided on whether a state can pursue a parens patriae action if private citizens could themselves sue. Compare New York v. 11
Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1982) (no), vacated on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (2d
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In some instances, though, an assertion of parens patriae status may rub
up against the bar against state challenges to the constitutionality of another
sovereign’s actions. Famously in Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Court distinguished between parens patriae actions against coordinate states, and such
actions against the federal government.72 Justice George Sutherland’s majority opinion asserted that “it is the United States, and not the State” that is
parens patriae in such instances.73 Mellon is one of the few occasions in which
a plaintiff’s standing seems to turn explicitly on the identity of the defendant.
There is now uncertainty as to the appropriate role of the state as parens
patriae.74 In Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, the Court seemed to lean on a
parens patriae theory of standing to enable a state challenge to a federal
agency’s failure to regulate over a categorical dissent by four more conservative Justices.75 Those same four Justices objected to state standing four years
later in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, where the defendant was not
a federal (or even a state) actor.76 That is, they seemed to suggest that the
Mellon bar applies to parens patriae cases against the federal government and
private parties. In contrast, the other Justices seemed to think that the bar
extends neither to instances in which the national government nor a
nonfederal actor is the defendant. In light of this divide over Mellon’s scope,
it seems fair to rank parens patriae as an area of abiding doctrinal uncertainty.
Second, state efforts to challenge other jurisdictions’ actions based on
allegations of fiscal impact have been divisive. On the one hand, a complaint
alleging that another state has legislated in such a way as to deprive the plaintiff state of “specific” tax revenues does engender standing.77 On the other
hand, the question whether federal action that induces a state to expend
more funds has generated sharp debate. For example, in a challenge to the
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(“DAPA”) program, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that
the State of Texas had standing because of costs associated with the issuance
Cir. 1983) (en banc), with Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 317–18 & nn.15–16 (3d
Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam) (yes).
72 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923); see also South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966) (similar for due process claims by individual
citizens against federal antidiscrimination statute).
73 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486.
74 Crocker, supra note 39, at 2073 (“Parens patriae doctrine and the Mellon bar in particular . . . remain frustratingly muddled.”).
75 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520, 523 n.20 (2007). But see Crocker, supra
note 39, at 2080–81 (arguing that the Mellon bar only applies to parens patriae standing, and
not when “sovereign” interests are invoked). It is hard to make much of the Massachusetts
v. EPA decision or its special solicitude language given the plurality of fragmentary theories
of standing in evidence there. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (2011). I am not inclined therefore to place much weight on that
opinion.
76 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011) (noting four–four
split on Court).
77 See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448 (1992); accord Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977) (similar standing analysis).
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of driving licenses to DAPA beneficiaries.78 The Supreme Court’s affirmance
of that judgment by an equally divided Court implied that at least four (conservative) Justices believed that Texas had standing on a theory of fiscal loss.
Four other (liberal) Justices either rejected that theory of standing or would
have found against Texas on the merits.
Fiscal effects are of particular importance as a basis for state standing
because it will almost always be the case that the state can gin up a fiscal
effect based on another sovereign’s action. For example, Texas could have
responded to DAPA by declining to issue licenses to undocumented individuals; it was the State’s choice to extend that benefit that generated the injury
in fact subsequently asserted in federal court.79 Rare will be the instance in
which the state has no choice but to spend.
Third, state efforts to creep around the Mellon rule against direct challenges to the validity of federal statutes or federal regulatory actions have
generated difficulty and apparent discord among the Justices. This category
of cases in which a state seeks to challenge federal action includes both
parens patriae and fiscal effects categories, but it is also more general in scope.
The uncertainty about state standing in suits against the federal government
extends beyond instances in which parens patriae or fiscal effects are alleged
to establish an injury in fact.
The question of state standing to challenge federal measures can arise
where federal law and state law come into conflict, and a state questions the
displacement of its norm. This can be characterized as a challenge to federal
law or as an effort to defend state law. On the one hand, Mellon suggests that
a state’s frontal challenge to a federal statute should fail. So, when a state
promulgates a measure that conflicts with the federal statute, it would seem
to follow that the state cannot circumvent the Mellon rule by the simple expedient of enacting a rule that is preempted by the federal statute. In the wake
of federal healthcare reform legislation in 2010, for example, Virginia pursued this tack by passing a law exempting its citizens from any federal health
insurance mandate. Its consequent suit was shut down on standing grounds
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.80
On the other hand, other cases suggest that a state may be the only
proper party to defend the validity of state law in federal court, and as such is
78 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–60 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (affirming state standing to challenge a federal
policy related to immigration).
79 Cf. Grove, supra note 48, at 894–95 (exploring this possibility).
80 See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 266 (4th Cir. 2011); see also
Crocker, supra note 39, at 2089–92 (discussing the background to this litigation). In a
parallel case, the Eleventh Circuit found that individual plaintiffs had standing to challenge the insurance mandate, obviating the need to consider state standing in that regard,
but also concluded that the states had standing to challenge the Medicaid expansion. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243–44
(11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519
(2012).
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a legitimate plaintiff.81 Hence, in Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court
permitted a suit by Missouri challenging the validity of a treaty on the ground
that it impinged upon “the alleged quasi sovereign rights of a State.”82 The
Holland Court cited two cases in which state standing had been recognized
on a parens patriae theory,83 that is, on the theory that “if the health and
comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper
party to represent and defend them.”84
Even in the absence of a plausible parens patriae claim, states have been
permitted to lodge direct challenges to federal action that impinges on
states’ regulatory freedom. For example, states have been able to directly
challenge federal conditional spending measures85 and federal statutes that
allegedly violate the bar on commandeering86 and federal statutes regulating
state electoral processes.87 Other cases, such as the 2005 decision in Gonzales
v. Oregon, have involved state challenges to federal regulations on federal statutory grounds.88 And in a variation on ‘pure’ state standing, the Court
recently affirmed the ability of a state legislature to challenge a ballot initiative removing its redistricting authority as a violation of its constitutionally

81 See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64–67 (1986) (“Because the State
alone . . . has [a] ‘direct stake’ . . . in defending” its laws, private individuals lack standing
to protect their continued enforceability absent some other injury in fact); see also Grove,
supra note 48, at 860–61 (collecting cases).
82 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920).
83 Id. (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142 (1902)).
84 Kansas, 185 U.S. at 141–42. Grove argues that Holland’s standing holding rests on
“the State’s sovereign interest in the continued enforceability of state law.” Grove, supra
note 48, at 865. I respectfully disagree. The cases upon which the Holland Court relied do
not focus on this interest, but on the interests of citizens in engaging in practices that
would be foreclosed or hindered by another sovereign’s actions. The same analysis holds
for another case that Grove cites, see id. at 866–67, the decision in Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S.
228, 229–30 (1925), in which the State challenged a federal regulation of roads within a
national park. Toll’s standing holding was explained on “quasi-sovereign[ty]” grounds, citing Holland. 268 U.S. at 230. This is most plausibly read to point toward the interest
Colorado citizens had in the roads at issue.
85 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205–06 (1987).
86 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152–54 (1992); see also Grove,
supra note 48, at 867 (discussing cases). The Court’s most recent commandeering case,
however, involved a suit filed by private plaintiffs. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1472
(2018).
87 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966).
88 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006). The Supreme Court did not address
standing, but the district court found that the Oregon had standing to sue. Oregon v.
Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087 (D. Or. 2002), review granted, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.
2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243; see also Grove, supra note 48, at 873–74 (discussing the case).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL510.txt

2144

unknown

Seq: 18

notre dame law review

1-JUL-19

13:48

[vol. 94:5

designated role.89 These cases suggest that when state and federal law conflicts, the state can sometimes challenge the federal rule. But since that is
precisely what the Mellon rule seems to rule out, we seem to have some ambiguity in the rule of decision.
C. Rationalizing Hard State Standing Cases
State standing has generated both easy and hard questions of law. Easy
cases can be found on either side of the Article III line. Meanwhile, the three
lines of “hard” cases that I have described are not mutually exclusive of each
other: state plaintiffs might invoke a parens patriae theory or a fiscal-effect
theory to challenge a federal measure. But the latter theories of Article III
standing can also be invoked to challenge other states’ regulatory decisions,
or even the conduct of private actors. Hence, neither the first nor the second line of contested cases is completely subsumed within the final one. This
incomplete and overlapping dissensus implies that there are multiple, and
concurrent, normative divides at stake in current debates over state standing.
My aim here, to reiterate, is not to offer a general normative framework
for making sense of these cases. It is worth noting here, however, that some
of the most recent ambitious efforts at theorizing state standing encounter
substantial difficulties. Two examples, both instances of exemplary clarity
and scholarly scruple, illustrate this point.
First, in their pathmarking and important article, Woolhandler and Collins have urged the “nonlitigability of sovereignty interests” as a position with
both a historical pedigree and present allure.90 They give a slate of reasons
for this position. But it is striking how many of these are deeply problematic.
A number of their grounds, to begin with, are characterized by an internal
circularity. For example, Woolhandler and Collins appeal to “the constitutional requirement, grounded in the separation of powers, that federal courts
hear only cases and controversies” to explain what comprises a case or controversy in the first place.91 Separately, their worry that state standing will
lead courts “to equalize power and right” is inconsistent with their embrace
of individual standing to press federalism interests: the latter is also a way in
which rights claims and claims about power are blended and “equalized” in
the sense of being proffered by the same litigant.92 Their acceptance of individual standing to lodge federalism concerns raises additional concern, since
it is articulated without any careful consideration of the perverse effects of
that allocation of power to individual litigants.93
Finally, Woolhandler and Collins suggest that segregating state and federal law enforcement would “help[ ] to maintain the vitality of the states as
89 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659,
2664–66 (2015) (describing the legislature as “an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury”).
90 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 15, 436.
91 Id. at 440.
92 Id. at 445–46.
93 See Huq, Standing, supra note 17, at 1508–14 (developing this concern).
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distinct political communities.”94 This empirical prediction is puzzling: it is
not at all clear why periodic state involvement in federal law enforcement
would imperil the sense of separate communities. Their argument here also
fails to account for the powerful case for state enforcement of federal law in
some (if not all) circumstances.95 I have focused here on what seem to me
the most powerful of Woolhandler and Collins’s rich set of arguments,
although they have other strings to their bow. At least on my reading, however, their arguments ultimately fail to persuade.96
Second, Professor Tara Grove has recently argued that states should
have “broad standing to challenge federal statutes and regulations that preempt, or otherwise undermine the continued enforceability of, state law,” but
at the same time should have no special role in challenging the manner in
which federal authorities comply with federal law.97 I am not so sure. A
threshold problem with Grove’s position, at least stated in this fashion, is
already implicit in my analysis so far: because states determine the content of
state law, they are in a position to promulgate measures—Texas’s driving
license mandate or Virginia’s antimandate—that are preempted by federal
law.98 They hence have power to fabricate ex nihilo a basis for suit pursuant
to Grove’s own formulation.99
Acknowledging that risk, Grove draws a distinction between state measures that regulate and measures that are declaratory in the sense that they
assert that “private citizens are not subject to legal requirements.”100 Grove
explains this distinction by asserting that “the State does not have the same
interest in a law that merely declares private parties to be exempt from legal
requirements.”101 But why not? Grove does not say, and I do not think that
the distinction (so crucial to the limiting ambition of her theory) is persuasive on its own terms. When a state regulates, it does not only, or even most
94 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 15, 436.
95 See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 765
(2011) (arguing that “state enforcement can promote the goals of federalism by opening
up new opportunities for decentralized decision making outside of the regulatory realm”
absent a need for uniformity).
96 A doctrinal solution based on historical practice might also be unstable to the
extent that the boundary cases and fiscal effects cases decided in the eighteenth century
provided bases for states to circumvent the limits that Woolhandler and Collins would
otherwise impose.
97 Grove, supra note 48, at 855. Note that Grove’s argument addresses only the third
of the categories outlined above. See supra text accompanying notes 66–79. It does not
fully address parens patriae cases or fiscal-effects cases, because both of the latter can be
lodged by states against nonfederal defendants. In another recent article, Professor Shannon Roesler offers the even narrower bore assertion that “states should have ‘governance’
standing to challenge federal power and action when the federal law at issue contemplates
an implementation role for state governments.” Roesler, supra note 39, at 641.
98 See sources cited supra notes 8–10.
99 The concern here is akin to the concern raised if Congress’s ability to define injuries-in-fact is unfettered. See supra text accompanying notes 30–35.
100 Grove, supra note 48, at 876–78.
101 Id. at 878.
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importantly, seek to prohibit private action. Much ordinary and quite important state law is aimed at enabling private action. State corporate law and
state contract law are large and important bodies of “enabling” state law that
are primarily declaratory, rather than prohibitory.102 It is not at all clear why
state efforts to carve out zones of private autonomy—i.e., deregulation—
through, for example, recognizing the autonomy of private associations or by
enabling religious organizations, should be seen as a second-tier state activity.
Nor is it clear why states have a distinctive interest in affirmative regulation.
In the end, therefore, Grove’s distinction between regulatory and declaratory measures lacks a plausible normative basis. One is left instead with the
sense that it is an ad hoc solution to the prospect that her proposed constraint on state standing dissolves in the face of strategic state action.103
At least for now, therefore, the doctrine of state standing will likely
remain a patchwork of partially theorized and inconsistent areas of stability
and flux. Valiant and powerful efforts to knit together a theoretical superstructure, such as Grove’s or Woolhandler and Collins’s, are vulnerable to
unraveling theoretical objections. It seems reasonable to expect, therefore,
the persistence of doctrinal uncertainty or overt contestation about the metes
and bounds of state standing alongside some islands of doctrinal stability.
II. RECUPERATING

THE

STAKES

OF

STATE STANDING

I have suggested so far that there are three domains of state standing
doctrine presently in live contestation. Rather than offering a theoretical
framework for ascertaining how these uncertainties should be resolved, my
aim in what follows is to account better for the implications of resolving those
uncertainties one way or another. That is, I want to ask why these disputes
might matter in practice.
This analysis of downstream consequences, to be sure, does not exhaust
the legally or doctrinally relevant considerations that could motivate a judge
faced with a state standing issue. More modestly, I hope to cast light on what
follows from accepting either a narrow or a broad reading of state standing’s
present controversies. As I have detailed already, these controversies are only
partially overlapping in terms of subject matter. To simplify the analysis, I
will focus on the third category of direct challenges to the validity of federal
statutes or federal regulatory actions. This encompasses much of the first
and second categories. As an ancillary matter, I will also explore the effects
of eliminating or embracing parens patriae and fiscal-effect theories of standing beyond the context of suits against a federal actor.
102 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26–28 (1961) (developing the concept of enabling rules).
103 Perhaps ad hoc equilibria are all that can be sustained in the state standing context;
but then Grove needs an explanation of why it is so troubling that states might challenge
federal action on federal law grounds. Cf. Lemos, supra note 95, at 717–36 (adumbrating
advantages of a state role in federal law enforcement).
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To begin with, it is useful to set out briefly the species of consequences
that I perceive as being at stake, and so will explore in detail below. First,
elimination (or embrace) of state standing might lead to an issue not being
resolved judicially, or relatedly, it might conduce to a resolution at the behest
of a private litigant rather than of a state actor. These might be called “different litigant” effects. Second, a resolution of state standing’s ambiguities
might impinge on the extent to which structural constitutional values, most
obviously federalism or separation of powers, are vindicated. These are
“structural constitutional effects.” Finally, the whittling away of state standing
might have “incentive effects.” Here, I will focus primarily on the role of
states’ attorneys general (“AGs”), who are responsible for filing many of the
relevant suits,104 and secondarily on spillovers to private actors. Let us consider each of these vectors in turn.
A. “Different Litigant” Effects
At a most basic level, state standing is self-evidently about who can bring
a case. In the limit, the question of “who” also implicates the question of
“whether” a specific legal issue will ever be pressed and passed on before a
federal court. The availability of state standing might determine whether an
issue is ever litigated in federal court, if there is no other litigant to press an
issue. And even if there is such an alternative litigant, it may also influence
how the issue is framed and resolved. I address first the risk that eliminating
state standing will render a specific legal question nonjusticiable. Then, I will
turn to potential ways in which such a reduction might change the manner in
which an issue is litigated.
1. The “Null Litigation Set” Risk
The possibility that a repudiation of state standing would vitiate all federal court review of a specific legal question can be called the “null litigation
set” problem. In practice, this is often raised as a reason to allow such standing in suits against the federal government.105 The argument has not been
raised in suits against nonfederal actors on parens patriae or fiscal-effects
grounds, presumably because it lacks traction there.106 But there are reasons
104 See Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence for the
Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 945 (2017) (“In most states, enforcement authority resides in the attorney general, who typically is elected independently.”).
105 See, e.g., Brief for State Respondents at 35–36, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016) (No. 15-674) (“It is aggressive enough to insist that States—which possess the dignity of sovereignty—are powerless to challenge DAPA’s legality. But defendants go further. At several points, they make clear that they believe nobody can challenge DAPA.”).
106 That said, there is a question as to whether certain mass tort suits would lose their
reforming potential without state plaintiffs. Cf. Charles M. Yablon, The Virtues of Complexity:
Judge Marrero’s Systemic Account of Litigation Abuse, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 244 n.29 (2018)
(“Litigation against tobacco companies, for example, posed little threat to such defendants
until the early 1990s, when increased involvement by state attorneys general and shifts in
legal theories emphasizing nondisclosures regarding the addictive nature of smoking

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL510.txt

2148

unknown

Seq: 22

notre dame law review

1-JUL-19

13:48

[vol. 94:5

for thinking this is either not a severe problem, or that it is not a persuasive
ground for either enlarging or diminishing state standing.
Consider first how realistic the possibility of a null litigation set is when
the defendant is the federal government. At a first approximation, it seems
quite likely that many of the legal questions that states press in suits that they
initiate against a federal defendant—or, indeed, on a parens patriae or a fiscalinterest theory—could also be raised by private litigants. Indeed, in recent
years, when states have filed challenges to the federal healthcare reform,
immigration prohibitions, and federal environmental policy,107 there have
been private litigants filing concurrently with state actors to vindicate the
same points of federal statutory or constitutional law. Often, concurrent private actions obviated the need for judicial resolution of the state standing
question.108 Indeed, concurrent private and state suits are so common that it
seems plausible at least to consider the possibility that the elimination of state
standing would never place an issue beyond federal court purview.
Even if a legal question could only be raised by a state in a federal district court on the ground that state standing was found to be unavailable,
moreover, that would not mean that the issue would be beyond judicial
review. Even if a state cannot raise a legal question in federal court, it is
possible that the same issue could be raised either in an enforcement action
in the federal government, or, alternatively, in a state enforcement action
filed first in state court, but eligible ultimately for review by certiorari in the
Supreme Court. A sufficiently determined state might even catalyze an
enforcement action by the federal government by, for example, announcing
that it will not comply with a federal law directive.109 Even when the federal
government supplies a benefit to individuals (such as an immigration status),
it is possible to imagine a plaintiff who in some fashion competes with those
individuals, thereby establishing “competitor standing.”110 For example,
greatly increased plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in such cases.”). I bracket that possibility
here and focus on federal defendant cases.
107 See supra text accompanying notes 8–10.
108 For instances in which private plaintiff standing was embraced as sufficient, obviating the need to address state standing, see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2415–16
(2018); Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1243–44 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519 (2012).
109 This is not a hypothetical. See, e.g., Katie Benner & Jennifer Medina, Trump Sues
California over Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/06/us/politics/justice-department-california-sanctuary-cities.html; see also David
S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, United States v. Texas: Ex Ante or Ex Post Judicial
Review?, YALE J. ON REG. (June 9, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/united-states-v-texas-exante-or-ex-post-judicial-review-by-david-s-rubenstein-pratheepan-gulasekara/ (exploring
this possibility in the DAPA case).
110 La. Energy & Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 141 F.3d 364, 367
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (articulating rules for establishing competitor standing). Another possibility is that “entities that compete with recipients of government funds would have standing to challenge the legality of those disbursements.” Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference:
Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1707 n.131 (2017).
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imagine a family law proceeding in which one parent’s custody is challenged
on the ground that her immigration status is ultra vires.111 Perhaps the most
likely null litigation set would arise when a state seeks to challenge the federal government’s decision to assign a benefit to a third party who lacks any
obvious competitor. But I am hard pressed to imagine that case at present.
Although it is difficult to compass all conceivable fact patterns, the sheer
range of procedural pathways to challenge the policies of either the federal
government or a coordinate state implies that the elimination of state standing would not materially alter the domain of legal questions cognizable in
federal court for the simple reason that few legal questions fall outside those
alternative pathways. The fluctuating nature of these different litigation
forms would create uncertainty about when and how a legal issue was raised.
It could bubble up, for example, as an element of a complaint, or as a
defense. But this would not defeat the possibility of federal court review. At
best, there may be a small set of cases in which null jurisdiction would result
from a denial of state standing.
A second reason for skepticism of the null litigation set argument
focuses on normative rather than empirical predicates. It turns upon the
question of why the absence of an alternative plaintiff should ever be a dispositive consideration for standing doctrine. It is not simply that the Court
has not identified this consideration as dispositive.112 Its relevance rests on
the assumption that a litigated resolution to a legal question is ipso facto
desirable. But why should that be? There are many constitutional questions
that never reach courts, and arguably never should. Many disputes arising
from the interaction of states’ interests and federal law are also “polycentric,”
and as such far from the ordinary subject matter of bilateral litigation.113 To
be fair, almost all major constitutional litigation has this character. But this
simply suggests that constitutional review now extends far beyond the institutional competence of the federal courts. It is not an argument for making
that overstretch worse.
Other strands of federal jurisdictional law, in any event, list against the
presumptive virtue of justiciability. They instead suggest that the existence of
federal law questions beyond a judicial purview is not necessarily a problem.
The doctrine of qualified immunity, for example, at a minimum, delays, and
in many instances wholly defeats, the possibility that a given specific constitu-

111 If that sounds like a silly procedural vehicle for litigating the validity of an important
federal program do not blame me: that kind of incongruity is the inevitable result of a
model of constitutional review anchored in “ordinary” litigation toed to an apex court that
engages in what is often in effect abstract constitutional adjudication. Silliness is
hardwired into this arrangement.
112 See Roesler, supra note 39, at 656.
113 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 395 (1978)
(analogizing a polycentric situation to a spider web, in which “each crossing of strands is a
distinct center for distributing tensions”).
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tional question will be litigated.114 Often the issues insulated from judicial
consideration concern what are normally thought of as important individual
rights. But this has not deterred the Court from aggressively pressing outward the boundaries of immunity doctrines.
On the other side of the ledger, some theories of state standing might
open the gates to the federal courthouse so wide that sheer volume concerns
would follow.115 In these cases, nonjusticiability might be desirable on quite
pragmatic grounds of sound institutional functioning. Complaints about the
absence of a federal forum for a specific legal question as a consequence of
the elimination of state standing, in short, rest upon a highly contestable,
and normatively unsupported, assumption that such a forum is always desirable.116 Once that assumption is cast aside, the reasons for caring about the
null litigation set risk seem pretty thin.
2. The Risk of Poorer Representation
Even if stand standing’s availability rarely determines the sheer possibility of federal court litigation of a legal question, it may well determine the
manner in which it is raised and litigated. It seems plausible to posit that
narrowing the availability of state standing will lead to issues being raised
more frequently by private litigants and later in the litigation process. It is
hard to see, however, why these possibilities should generate much normative
concern one way or another.
To begin with, delays are often framed as a positive good that enables
“learning” on the part of apex courts.117 Nor is there obvious significance in
having an issue presented in either an affirmative or a defensive posture.
The Declaratory Judgment Act,118 indeed, is a procedural device that invites
and enables litigants to alter the sequence and framing of litigation. In
effect, they can flip the order in which issues are raised. Yet, the Act is not
perceived as problematic as a result.119
114 For a development of this point in respect to Fourth Amendment law, see Orin S.
Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v.
Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 244–45.
115 For the canonical articulation of this concern, see Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting
Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 89. For a persuasively skeptical view of such floodgates
claims, see Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1043–49
(2013).
116 My own view is that one should be quite skeptical of the value of litigation over
structural constitutional questions. See sources cited supra note 17.
117 Chad Westerland et al., Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891, 902–03 (2010).
118 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012).
119 Indeed, the standard critique of the Declaratory Judgment Act is roughly the opposite: that “Congress approved the declaratory judgment device precisely because it
expanded the scope of federal court power and the timing of its exercise.” Donald L.
Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created
a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn’t Looking, 36
UCLA L. REV. 529, 549 (1989). For trenchant criticism of Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
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Given that, I think the more colorable risk to consider is whether
changes to the availability of state standing will lead to changes in the manner in which an issue is litigated as it moves from state to private hands. It
has been claimed in the literature that the “institutional design and political
incentives of states’ attorneys general . . . make them well-suited to represent
state interests,” and ipso facto more qualified in that regard than private litigants.120 This claim assumes a differential between public and private counsel. I am skeptical this distinction is a material one in practice. As Professor
Margaret Lemos and her coauthors have convincingly demonstrated in a
series of insightful articles, the assumption does not necessarily hold up in
practice. To begin with, state actors as much as private litigants are often
moved primarily by “self-interested incentives to emphasize monetary penalties in enforcement actions.”121 In other circumstances, state litigation decisions may be well explained by partisan motivations “rather than fealty to the
abstract interests of the state qua state.”122 There is no reason, given this
evidence, to presume that state plaintiffs will be somehow more purely legalistic in motivation than private actors across the mine run of cases. (Case-bycase variation, however, is inevitable.)
Nor should we be optimistic about the democratic credentials of litigation helmed by a state actor. Focusing on parens patriae actions, Lemos
rightly observes that “group members will typically lack the political clout to
control their representative’s litigation conduct in any meaningful way.”123
There is no reason to think the same will not hold when state standing is
based on fiscal effects or another contested basis. Instead, government lawyers’ incentives are not easily modeled in a univariate way across the spectrum of state standing cases. Just like private litigants, they are a motley
bunch.
A closer examination of the actual (as opposed to assumed) motivations
of public and private litigators further undermines the assumption that the
former will necessarily do a superior job. Contrary to the assumption that
state-led litigation will be more vigorously pursued, the standard models of
government officials emphasize the absence of powerful fiscal incentives, and

Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), the leading precedent, see Doernberg & Mushlin, supra, at
549–50.
120 Grove, supra note 48, at 856; see also Roesler, supra note 39, at 677 (arguing that
states are well suited to vindicate an interest in “shared governance” (emphasis omitted)).
121 Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV.
853, 887 (2014). Of course, this is not always true. Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1442 (1998)
(observing that some government lawyers choose their employment “out of a devotion to
public service”).
122 Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: Attorneys General As
Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1233 (2015).
123 Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 521 (2012).
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the dominance of “low powered” motivational tools.124 Even if these models
are a simplification of a complex reality, I think they contain more than a
grain of truth. Under plausible assumptions, a reliance on state-led litigation
is likely to generate suboptimal enforcement strategies by government lawyers.125 At the same time, there is some evidence that private lawyers
entrusted with the same tasks as government lawyers perform better, at least
in terms of standard metrics of litigation success rates.126 This evidence suggests that it would be unwise to assume each time a state plaintiff is swapped
out for a private litigant, the legal issue at stake will be less vigorously
pursued.
Finally, the public/private binary is simply not as fixed in the first
instance as is assumed in the state standing literature. As Lemos has
explained, both state and federal entities have come to “rely on a mix of
public and private litigation, though the balance has shifted over the years as
private enforcement has gained prominence in some areas once dominated
by government, and has given way to public authority in other contexts.”127
As a result, even if a state is the nominal plaintiff, this does not mean that the
litigation will be controlled by someone who is paid out of the state’s coffers.
The lesson to be drawn here from these theoretical and empirical findings is that it is hazardous to posit a binary dichotomy between private and
public plaintiffs. In practice, these two categories are not distinct in motivational or personnel terms.128 Not all the considerations point in the same
direction. Perhaps a careful empirical study could disentangle effects, and
identify purely private or public litigation as superior. In the absence of such
a study, though, it is premature to assume that a move from public to private
plaintiffs would change the manner in which legal issues are pressed in federal court.
B. Structural Constitutional Effects
A second possible reason for concern about changes to the availability of
state standing turns on the downstream effects of doctrinal recalibration
upon structural constitutional values such as federalism and the separation of
124 Jean Tirole, The Internal Organization of Government, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 6
(1994).
125 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
305, 311 (1972) (modeling agency enforcement to show that “under plausible assumptions
concerning the characteristics of the agency’s cases a perfectly rational, utility-maximizing
administrative agency will devote a ‘disproportionate’ amount of its resources to relatively
minor cases”).
126 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence
from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1249 (2012) (finding that specialized
private litigators under the False Claims Act do quite well).
127 Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515, 524 (2016) (footnote omitted).
128 Id. at 528 (rejecting the notion “that public litigation is superior to private litigation,” but insisting “that it is different”).
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powers. Rather strikingly, commentators have diverged about exactly what
these effects are, while supplying relatively little by way of theoretical or
empirical foundation for their positions. On the one hand, Woolhandler
and Collins insist that a narrow construction of state standing, which would
exclude all three of the contested categories identified above, would vindicate the separation of powers and federalism. To substantiate this claim, they
point to the putative intrinsic benefit of each government enforcing its own
laws. They also posit a “preference for state-versus-individual actions over
government-versus-government actions [to] enhance[] the status of the individual as a rights-holder against government.”129 They finally suggest that
the separation of powers benefits by mitigating the risk of “abstract decision[s] on the legality of a state or federal legislature’s exercise of power.”130
On the other hand, scholars such as Professors Tara Grove and Gillian
Metzger have argued that federalism concerns “strongly support” recognition
of state standing to vindicate their own sovereign prerogatives.131 Yet other
scholars have endorsed a broad view of state standing doctrine as a means to
vindicate the separation of powers, at least when the federal government is
the defendant.132 By assumption, that justification would not extend to
parens patriae or fiscal-interest cases in which a nonfederal actor was the
defendant.
The diversity of views on how recalibrating state standing would realize
(or retard) structural constitutional values suggests an ambiguity in terms
such as “federalism” and the “separation of powers.” This ambiguity means
that different commentators, as well as different judges, can use those terms
to pick out divergent desirable end states. Claims about state standing’s consequences for either federalism or the separation of power therefore risk a
certain vacuity in the absence of a robust specification of how various normative threads of the structural Constitution are to be knitted together.
This point can be illustrated using the separation of powers. As I have
recently observed in another article, the latter term is used in American constitutional law to capture a range of different and mutually inconsistent mod-

129 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 15, at 439.
130 Id. at 440.
131 Grove, supra note 48, at 891; see also Metzger, supra note 75, at 40.
132 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing and “The New
Process Federalism,” 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1739, 1749 (2017) (“Standing doctrine focused on
state challenges to the executive branch makes good sense, then, not because Congress
represents state interests, but rather because the President or federal agency officials must
come to the table.”); F. Andrew Hessick & William P. Marshall, State Standing to Constrain
the President, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 83, 103 (2018) (arguing, with caveats, that “states are particularly well positioned to constrain expanding executive power”). But see Jason Lynch, Note,
Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 1998 (2001) (casting doubt on the relevance of either federalism
or separation of powers lens in respect to coordinated multistate litigation pursued by state
AGs).
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els of interbranch interaction.133 These models then tend to make quite
divergent assumptions about the motivations of officials within each of the
branches of government.134 Further, they diverge as to whether to “predict
institutional change or its inverse, a stable institutional equilibrium.”135 As a
result of these divergent assumptions, the term “separation of powers” can
only be specified by selecting an underlying model of desirable interbranch
interactions, making assumptions about officials’ motivations, and selecting
between stable-state and dynamic predictions. Rather than specifying a precise concept, the term “separation of powers” in fact encompasses a loosely
concatenated range of institutional possibilities. It is perhaps no wonder
then that when the term is invoked in debates respecting state standing, it
may well be in reference to different things: a constraint on the federal
courts’ role; a check on presidential initiatives in tension with congressional
preferences; or a check on federal action beyond constitutional bounds.136
A further difficulty with leaning upon structural constitutional logic to
inform state standing is the abiding uncertainty over the empirical predicates
of those theories’ predictions. A federalism-based argument for state standing of the kind that Grove and Metzger offer, for example, rests on the
assumption that states will litigate in ways that preserve state prerogatives in
the aggregate. But in many recent disputes in which states have sought to
influence federal courts, states have lined up on both sides of the case such
that their efforts alternatively support and press for limits on federal
action.137 In these cases, the expressed preferences of the states do not support the proposition that federalism values are solely on one side of the case
or the other.
Indeed, just a moment’s contemplation of the manifold and complex
ways in which immigration, national healthcare reform, and national environmental standards can impact the policymaking initiatives and the purses
of states undercuts any simple idea that federalism is always only on one side
of the balance. Instead, there is “no a priori reason” to expect that expanded
state standing “will always yield less horizontal aggrandizement, less strategic

133 Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of Powers Metatheory, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1526 (2018)
(book review) (identifying separation, balance, and exogenous models of the separation of
powers).
134 Id. at 1553–54.
135 Id. at 1560.
136 In fact, the problem is a bit worse since other national apex courts have understood
the term “separation of powers” in quite distinct ways. See Aziz Z. Huq, A Tactical Separation
of Powers?, 14 CONST. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing South African Constitutional
Court’s recent separation of powers jurisprudence).
137 This can most crisply be observed in the context of amici filings. See, e.g., Michael E.
Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L.
REV. 355, 367 (2012) (discussing states lining up on both sides of Clean Water Act cases);
see also Lemos & Quinn, supra note 122, at 1233 (“Nor is it unheard of for states to appear
on both sides of cases before the Court.”).
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state action, or a ‘better’ federal balance”—i.e., more federalism or better federalism, however those terms might be defined.138
A similar problem bubbles up in respect to separation of powers arguments for robust state standing turning on the claim that states can work to
curtail presidential infidelity to congressional directives.139 Depending on
the case, federal legislative interests may align with the state plaintiff, or
instead lie on the other side of the ledger. Often, it will not be clear whether
the presidency or its opponents are being more faithful to the original legislative deal. Much depends on whether you see the state as defending an
original legislative bargain or seeking its unraveling. In the immigration context, for example, states challenging DAPA might be viewed as seeking the
enforcement of federal immigration statutory law against a delinquent presidency. Alternatively, these suits can instead be understood as reneging on a
legislatively created status quo in which far more behavior is treated as illegal
than can plausibly be punished using the resources appropriated for enforcement.140 Whether state challenges to DAPA facilitate or undermine presidential fidelity to congressional directions, in short, turns out to be a
normative judgment about the nature of the discretion generated by the
inconsistent directives of immigration law. I suspect that a similar sort of
ambiguity will arise in many such cases.
My argument in this Section, I should concede, has a heterodox and
perhaps even heretical cast. Like judges, commentators like enlisting “federalism” or the “separation of powers” into their lists in a close policy or doctrinal dogfight. But such conscriptions run quickly up against the sheer
complexity of these concepts. I fear that neglect of that complexity is too
frequent. Such structural arguments are also hindered by the profound
empirical challenges of ascertaining how discrete legal changes nudge or
push large, complex institutional ecosystems onto new pathways. I am skeptical that those terms of structural constitutionalism should be awarded the
clear normative heft they too often assume in legal discourse. They should,
that is, be far less frequently employed as spirit levels by legal analysts. In the
present context, they are sufficiently indeterminate in the absence of more
careful theoretical specification and more robust empirics that I believe they
should not be invoked to move state standing doctrine one way or another.
C. Incentive Effects
The final dimension along which the effects of state standing’s recalibration might be felt pertains to the incentives of the individuals involved in
litigating the cases. The state is commonly (if not inevitably, as Lemos has
138 Huq, Collective Action, supra note 17, at 297–98.
139 See supra note 132.
140 See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 510–11 (2009) (describing the rise of “de facto delegation” in immigration
law).
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instructed us) represented by the state’s AG. Many state AGs are elected.141
Many have abiding ambition for higher state or federal office. Litigation,
and in particular litigation against the federal government in the name of the
state’s prerogatives, can be pursued because it will “win favor with their constituents, [and] attorneys general [will] further their careers.”142 The former
AG of Texas, subsequently its governor, hence characterized his job as, “I go
into the office. I sue the federal government and I go home.”143 Empirical
studies suggest that AGs who engage in multistate litigation are more likely to
pursue higher office, presumably because participation in lawsuits is an effective means of obtaining ideologically charged name recognition with the voting public.144
Expanding state standing increases the opportunities for like officials to
use the power to file suit on the state’s behalf as an instrument for personal
or partisan advancement. Correspondingly, narrowing opportunities for
state suits lowers the stakes for AGs, pushing ambitious individuals either to
find other ways to make their mark as an AG or else to pursue other pathways
to political power. There is thus an unambiguous connection between their
incentives and the permissible scope of state standing. The AG is likely not
the only person affected by the recalibration for state standing. The shift in
their roles, which appears to have begun in the 1980s,145 also shapes the
larger local political environment within a state, drawing in more national
dollars and changing the nature of electoral contests. In recent years, campaign contributions in state AG races have ballooned.146 Although it is far
from clear that this change in the fiscal environment is caused by changes in
the litigation activity discussed here, it seems reasonable to predict that
(holding all else equal) many of the national donors now entangled in state
AG races147 would be less inclined to intervene in the absence of potential
suits (say) against undesirable federal policies.
141 Lynch, supra note 132, at 2002.
142 Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and
Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2143 (2015).
143 Sue Owen, Greg Abbott Says He Has Sued Obama Administration 25 Times, POLITIFACT
(May 10, 2013), http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2013/may/10/greg-abbott/
greg-abbott-says-he-has-sued-obama-administration-/.
144 Colin Provost, When Is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy Making
Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General, 40 PUBLIUS 597, 610–12 (2009) (presenting
empirical results to this effect).
145 Paul Nolette, The Dual Role of State Attorneys General in American Federalism: Conflict
and Cooperation in an Era of Partisan Polarization, 47 PUBLIUS 342, 343 (2017).
146 Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 86–87 (2018); accord Dan Levine & Lawrence Hurley, “These are
Desperate Times”: Big Money Is Pouring into State Attorney General Races, BUS. INSIDER (July 31,
2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/r-trump-bump-court-fights-draw-big-money-intoattorney-general-races-2017-7.
147 Ben Wieder, Big Money Comes to State Attorney-General Races, ATLANTIC (May 8, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/us-chamber-targets-dems-in-stateattorney-general-races/361874/.
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Paradoxically, the clearest and most direct variable affected by Article III
state standing doctrine is the quality of intrastate political life. Whether this
is a desirable spillover from a robust account of state standing, or a pernicious side effect, depends on one’s view of the proper role of a state AG and
the kind of elections for statewide office that are desirable. Some commentators have decried derogations from AGs’ traditional role as “representatives
of their states.”148 Others have acutely observed that many instances of stateled litigation concern vertical conflicts with the federal government and horizontal, distributional conflicts among various states.149
These different effects of state standing have different normative
valences, but are they are also entangled in practice. They are hence hard to
evaluate separately. Evaluating the effects of state-led litigation accordingly
thus presents complex normative and empirical questions. Because views on
these questions are unlikely to be uniform, and instead contested, I think it is
reasonable to conclude that incentive effects, while more substantial than
litigant effects or structural constitutional effects, do not necessitate counsel
in favor of or against state standing. Or at least they do not without committing to further normative propositions and more extensive empirical investigation on the ground.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that a recalibration of state standing’s open doctrinal
questions would have important influence on the incentives of state AGs,
with spillover consequences for the local political environment in states
where AGs are elected. In contrast, it is at present speculative and uncertain
whether such recalibration would alter the possibility that, or manner in
which, federal law questions are presented in federal court. Certainly, the
order of litigation presentation would in some instances change, but it is
hard to draw any compelling normative inference from this prediction.
Similarly, reports of the salience of state standing for either the horizontal or the vertical elements of the structural Constitution are rather overstated. It is not at all obvious that more state-led litigation will tether the
President more closely to legislative preferences, or instead enable executiveled defections from those preferences. (And it is also not clear that a complex conception such as the separation of powers should be conceptually
boiled down to such effects.) Nor is the horizontal effect on the American
federal system of states clear. Simply put, it is hard to predict whether the
distributive consequences of such litigation will outweigh their positive
effects on states’ legal entitlements. These structural stakes of state standing,
therefore, are characterized by considerable uncertainty in many ways.
I can imagine two responses to this uncertainty. The first is the retreat
to formalism, and an insistence that precedent, constitutional text, or the like
148 PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 200 (2015).
149 See Lemos & Young, supra note 146, at 96–100.
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alone provide a solution to the state standing problem. Of course, it is quite
possible to plunder these sources in search of doctrinal fixes. At the same
time, a formalist solution needs some sort of justification in the absence of
compelling evidence of historical settlement. The instability of run-of-themill Article III doctrine, however, is ample proof that such settlement is
sorely wanting, and that the choice between formalist solutions needs justification. I thus see no way here of avoiding the need to think through hard
questions of consequences.
A second approach is to recognize the need for theoretical precision
and empirical substantiation before reaching broad conclusions about the
path of state standing law. So far as I can tell from my reading of the literature, this sort of modest and empirically informed approach seems to have
largely fallen out of favor in federal courts scholarship of late.150 I think that
is disappointing, especially in an era of increasing partisan polarization that
will surely not leave the legal academy unaffected. I suspect that in the coming years, law professors (who can already be often identified with a particular ideological position in the larger partisan spectrum) will come under
greater and greater pressure to hew to a party line. For all sorts of reasons, I
think this is very unfortunate but likely unavoidable. The result will be pressure for the legal academy to shift from what is clearly scholarly production
to forms of ideological production, working as organic intellectuals of vying
political formations.
With this in mind, I think a more cautious, incremental, and empiricalstate-contingent analysis is warranted not just in this domain, but in respect
to many questions of federal jurisdictional design more generally. This Essay
has been a modest contribution to that epistemic enterprise.

150

Margaret Lemos’s work, cited throughout this Essay, is an important exception.

